In this paper, we show that the regional finance-growth nexus in Italy is robust to a series of innovations with respect to the existing literature on the topic. We use finer measures of economic and financial development, as well as instruments with a deeper economic content. We rely on state-of-the-art cross-sectional and panel estimation methods, and we offer a thorough investigation of the nonlinearities in the relation between finance and growth. Our results show that, while local financial development is a key factor for economic growth, in regions with inefficient courts more credit might translate into reduced growth due to opportunistic behaviour and the consequent misallocation of funds.
Background
Since the groundbreaking contributions of King and Levine (1993a,b) , economists have shown renewed interest in the finance-growth nexus. Results have often been conflicting across studies using a variety of indicators for financial development, different econometric methods, model specifications, and datasets. In this regard, a thorough review is offered by Levine (2004) .
Focusing on cross-country studies using measures of financial development connected to the banking sector, Levine (1998) , Levine et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2000) designed an innovative research strategy. In order to overcome possible biases deriving either from the endogeneity of financial development indicators within a growth regression, or from the omission of possible relevant variables, they took two steps. In the first step, they resorted to the following model within a cross-sectional framework = α + β + γ + ε,
where: G was either per capita GDP growth, or growth of capital stock per head, or productivity growth; F was different financial development indicators; X was a set of controls (income per capita, education, political stability, indicators of exchange rate developments, international trade, fiscal and monetary policy); α, β and γ were coefficients; and ε was the stochastic error. F was instrumented by indicators of origin of the legal system, which, according to the literature, affects the letter and the enforcement of national credit laws, protecting external investors and promoting financial development to different extents.
In the second step, they resorted to dynamic panel models, with the following specification
where: y i,t was the log of real per capita GDP at time t in country i; Z i,t was a set of controls including financial indicators; η i was an unobserved country-specific effect; and ε i,t a stochastic error.
However, the earlier promising results of Levine and co-authors need to be qualified, since they rely on a strong assumption: the poolability of countries at different stages of development. This assumption has found scant empirical support in the empirical literature (Arestis et al., 2004 , Rioja and Valev, 2004 , Loyaza and Ranciere, 2005 , Apergis et al., 2007 , Schiavo and Vaona, 2007 .
As a matter of consequence, Vaona (2008a), using Italian data, proposed to apply the research strategy designed by Levine and co-authors to a regional setting, where poolability is supported by statistical tests. In this context, financial development can have an impact on local growth due to market segmentation (Guiso et al., 2004a) .
To this purpose, an Italian dataset appears particularly interesting, given the intensive monitoring activity implemented by the Bank of Italy on local credit market conditions, and given the considerable attention that the international literature has devoted to Italian regions so far (Lucchetti et al., 2001; Guiso et al., 2004a Guiso et al., , b, 2006 Usai and Vannini, 2005; Jappelli et al., 2005) .
In order to show the robustness of our results, we follow the setup of Vaona (2008a), using a sample of Italian NUTS-3 regions, performing both cross-section and dynamic panel estimations, and controlling for endogeneity, spatial unobserved heterogeneity, spatial correlation and poolability. For the dynamic panel estimates we use three-year averages in order to overcome possible distortions deriving from business cycles, and we rely on Roodman (2005).
Model Specification and Innovations of the Paper
Regarding the model specification, on the one hand, our choices for G, F and y represent one of the elements of novelty of the paper, and are illustrated below. On the other hand, for X and Z, we follow Second, we use a finer measure of financial development. Since Vaona (2008b) showed that credit to households and non-profit organisations, credit to non-financial enterprises with a public structure, and credit to the public administration are not connected to economic growth, we focus here only on credit supplied by private banks to private firms, taking -in a regional setting -a similar step to the one taken by Levine et al. (2000) in the cross-country literature. On the one hand, our measure of financial development is aggregate, so it is not a direct indicator of credit rationing based on micro data, as the one used by Guiso et al. (2004a) . On the other hand, its availability for many years makes it possible to show not only cross-sectional but also longitudinal evidence, as in cross-country studies. Furthermore, Jappelli et al. (2005) showed that different measures of financial development in Italian regions tend to show similar geographical patterns.
Third, the instruments used by Vaona (2008a) in his cross-section estimation have mainly a statistical nature, being regional dummies not related with future growth, which should capture regional disparities in the efficiency and efficacy of courts within a country. Here, similarly to Jappelli et al.
( 2005), we consider as instruments two direct measures of efficiency and efficacy of the judiciary system: the length of first instance and appeal civil trials. In particular, we consider both their unweighted sum and the sum weighted by the number of trials in each instance. We do so in order to capture the possible effects of the presence of agents, who discount time in different ways and, therefore, could weight differently the length of first instance and appeal trials. In the instruments set of the dynamic panel data estimator, we include the lags in the levels and in the first differences of logs of the two variables above, as well as of private credit to private firms. Descriptive statistics for all the data are set out in Table 1 .
Fourth, and finally, when considering dynamic panel data estimation, we manage to capture the nonlinearities underlying the finance-growth nexus, by fitting to the data a dynamic model of the (log of) real per capita GDP containing a third-order polynomial (in logs) of our indicator of financial development, besides the further controls sketched above. Consistently with Rioja and Valev (2004), we find that the higher is the degree of local financial development, the weaker is its impact on growth.
However, consistently with De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) and Guariglia and Poncet (2007) and similarly to Rioja and Valev (2004) , we also find that, in provinces with an inefficient allocation of credit, a higher ratio between credit and local GDP can have a negative impact on growth. Our identification strategy allows us to propose a new explanation of why this might happen. 2 In regions with a highly inefficient judiciary system, opportunistic behaviour is widespread. Under these conditions, banks fund projects doomed to fail and to absorb more economic resources than their returns. Consequently, the growth rate of local economies may be damaged -rather than benefitedby a greater availability of credit.
The following section illustrates our results and concludes. A similar picture emerges when considering panel data estimates (Table 3) . Convergence is still a major factor affecting growth, given the significance of the first lag of real per capita GDP. However, the exposure to international markets is important as well, possibly reflecting the consequent better allocation of production factors. As anticipated above, financial development has a highly nonlinear effect on growth. A third-order polynomial in private credit to private firms turns out to be significant at a 5 per cent level. In order to better assess the connection between finance and growth, we simulate the model over the interval between the minimum and maximum values of private credit to private firms over GDP, keeping the significant controls at their average values, and forcing the coefficient of insignificant variables to zero. Figure 1 shows our results. As anticipated in the previous section, finance has a positive -though declining -effect on growth. However, in regions where the judiciary system is inefficient and opportunistic behaviour is more widespread, more finance might translate into less growth, as more resources are inefficiently allocated to poor projects.
Results and Conclusions
In order to assess the poolability of provinces belonging to the South, the Centre, the North-West and the North-East of Italy, we interacted the third-order polynomial in our measure of financial development with dummies for each of the four Italian macro-regions. 4 A Wald test for the equality of the coefficients across macro-regions could not reject the null. All the other specification tests support the model.
Summarizing, in this study we showed that the finance-growth nexus at the regional level in Italy is robust to a series of innovations in the analysis carried out. With respect to previous studies, we used more refined measures of economic growth and financial development. Moreover, we used instruments with a deeper economic content than earlier, and we offered a better assessment of the nonlinearities characterizing the finance-growth nexus. To conclude, the judiciary system is of paramount importance in understanding this economic issue. The more efficient are the courts located in a local economy, the better will its credit market work, and funds will be less likely to be allocated to projects doomed to fail. Notes: a all real variables were deflated using the CPI of the main city of each province. The base year is 1985. b billions of eurolire over millions of eurolire (by eurolire we mean that for the years after the introduction of the Euro we converted the value of the variables into Lire by using the official exchange rate of €1 = ₤1936.27). To obtain percentages, divide by 10. c number of students over resident population in thousands. To obtain percentages divide by 10. d number of crimes over resident population in thousands. To obtain the number of crimes per inhabitant, divide by 1000.
e in ten thousands of eurolire. * denotes coefficients significant at the 5% level. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Instruments in the 2SLSDV regression in the second column include the weighted and the un-weighted sums of the length of first instance and appeal civil trials. a exports and imports include only goods traded on international markets, since interregional trade is not registered. b this dummy was significant when including a full set of regional dummies. So we chose to keep it in the model. c the null is no spatial correlation.
d the null is that the random-effects and the fixed-effects estimators are similar. If they are not similar, the latter will be preferred. e the null is no endogeneity in the comparison between the LSDV and the 2SLSDV estimators.
f the null is that the instruments are not correlated with the instrumented variables.
g the null is that instruments in excess with respect to instrumented variables are not correlated with 2SLS residuals. 359 Notes: the instruments are past first differences and past levels of (Private credit to private firms over GDP) t-1 , logs of the weighted and un-weighted sums of the length of first instance and appeal civil trials. * denotes coefficients significant at the 5% level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. a exports and imports include only goods traded on international markets as interregional trade is not registered. b the null is absence of first order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Presence of first order serial correlation in the differenced residuals does not affect the validity of estimates. c the null is absence of second order serial correlation in the differenced residuals.
d the null is that instruments in excess with respect to instrumented variables are not correlated with GMM residuals. We preferred the Hansen test to the Sargan test, because the former is robust to heteroskedasticity, and we do not have a large number of instruments when compared to the cross-sectional dimension of the dataset. e the null is no spatial correlation.
f the null is that the coefficient of the financial indicator is the same across provinces belonging to the South, the North-East, the North West and the Centre of Italy, respectively.
